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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
The Ford Model A was advertised as “the latest and best” in the
world 1 in 1903 and sparked global interest to design and create better,
faster, and more complex machines than had ever traveled on land. Fast
forward to the 21st century and creating machines that can travel around
the world’s airspace appears to be the latest fascination. Until relatively
recently, only airplanes and helicopters dominated the friendly skies. But
now, the public is catching on to the idea that building an aircraft is easier
that one might expect. In fact, a pilot is no longer necessary. Drones, also
referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA), can fly without a human operator. 2 Chris Anderson, a selfdeclared “drone evangelist,” confirmed that:
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1

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Vehicle History: The First Model A Laid a Foundation for the
Future, http://corporate.ford.com/our-company/heritage/vehicle-history-news-detail/670model-a-1903 (last visited Mar.4, 2014).
2

DAVID GOLDBERG ET AL., UNIV. OF OXFORD REUTERS INSTI. FOR THE STUDY OF
JOURNALISM, REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS & JOURNALISM: OPPORTUNITIES
AND CHALLENGES OF DRONES IN NEWS GATHERING 4 (2013).
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“Thanks to Smartphones, and Wii controllers and other
consumer electronics, we have all the necessary elements to
create a Drone. Sensors, wireless, GPS, processors,
cameras, everything that’s the Smartphone revolution has
basically made the technologies cheap and available and
this has just happened over the past four or five years.” 3
Domestic drones designed for private use are the new phenomenon—a 14
billion dollar industry with trade shows popping up every month and more
and more manufacturers getting on board as they await the green light
from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to begin full scale drone
flights throughout the United States. 4 As one UAV manufacturer put it,
“If the job is too dull, dirty, or dangerous—get a UAV to do it.” 5

3

Id. at 2-3. Chris Anderson is the former editor of Wired magazine and founded 3D
Robotics, a company that sells drones that can fly for 15 to 20 minutes with HD cameras
attached. See Michael S. Rosenwald, A Drone of Your Very Own: These Aren’t Your
Average Remote-Controlled Aircraft, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2013)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/personal-drones-delivering-wedding-rings-insteadof-missiles/2013/08/17/75ed2092-ff7e-11e2-9711-3708310f6f4d_story.html.
4

See Alistair Barr & Elizabeth Weise, Underground Drone Economy Takes Flight, USA
TODAY (Dec. 2, 2013, 9:37 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/12/02/underground-drone-economy/3805387.
5

GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. Drones perform missions that previously
fell into three distinct categories: dull, dirty, and dangerous. Dull
meant long flights during which pilots faced fatigue flying to remote
areas of the globe. Dirty included situations where nuclear weapons or
biological weapons might be involved. Dangerous meant missions
over denied territories such as the Soviet Union, North Korea, and
China, where shoot-downs were a political risk.

ANNIE JACOBSEN, AREA 51: AN UNCENSORED HISTORY OF AMERICA’S TOP SECRET
MILITARY BASE 218 (2011).

2
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[2]
Domestic drones have also caught the eye of local, state, and
federal law enforcement. Surveillance, an investigative tool that can
oftentimes prove to be a “dull, dirty, or dangerous” job, could be easily
supplemented with drones in the sky. 6 Drones could assist law
enforcement as cost-effective eyes in the sky during undercover or
informant operations, during search warrant executions, while monitoring
potentially violent suspects, or while viewing suspected marijuana grows.
However, state and federal legislators are seemingly shutting down this
possibility before it gets off the ground.
[3]
Unlike other technological advances that, in the past, have seemed
to sneak up on legislators after courts have ruled on their constitutionality,
drone legislation has become the new craze. Twelve states have already
passed legislation that significantly limits government drone flights, and
twenty-one states have legislation pending on the matter. 7 Perhaps
legislators have scenes of deadly drone strikes in Yemen or Afghanistan in
their minds, or they recently watched the latest science fiction movie in
which a drone-like machine relentlessly pursues the movie’s hero
throughout the city streets and scanned his retina to identify him. 8 Or
6

See JACOBSEN, supra note 5, at 218.

7

See infra Tables 1-5; see also Allie Bohm, Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation
in the States, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-andliberty/status-2014-domestic-drone-legislation-states (last updated June 6, 2014)
[hereinafter 2014 Status of Domestic Drone Legislation]; Allie Bohm, Status of Domestic
Drone Legislation in the States, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/print/blog/technology-and-liberty/status-domestic-dronelegislation-states (last updated Jan. 22, 2014) [hereinafter 2013 Status of Domestic Drone
Legislation]. An additional twelve states have drone legislation regarding law
enforcement use that is either dead, tabled, or recommended for further study. Id. Three
states, Alaska, Indiana, and Nevada, passed laws relating to drones that does not relate to
law enforcement use. Id.
8

See MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002). See generally THE BOURNE
LEGACY (Universal Pictures 2012) (in THE BOURNE LEGACY, armed drones were used to
assassinate government operators and destroy buildings).

3
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perhaps they are concerned that these drones will become self-aware and
turn into HAL in the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey. 9 Whatever the case
may be, drones and their potential uses have captured the public’s
attention in a way few other technologically advanced tools have.
[4]
With the expected rise in drone use in the next several years,
Congress appears to have two concerns: safety and privacy. Congress
passed its safety concerns onto the FAA with the passage of the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. 10 The FAA has been assigned
the task to create regulations for government and civilian drone use by
September 2015. 11 These regulations, Congress hopes, will alleviate any
safety concerns surrounding drone flights. As to privacy, the federal
government has yet to pass legislation arising from privacy concerns with
the increase in drone use by civilians and government actors alike;
however, several bills are being considered. The Preserving American
Privacy Act of 2013 would effectively require a warrant before a drone
could be used. 12 As mentioned, several states have already tackled the
privacy implications of government drone use head-on.
[5]
These safety and privacy concerns will lead to regulations for two
types of drone users: government actors or law enforcement, and civilians.
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the use of drones by government
9

See 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 1968). As drone researchers
have stated, “if only we could be so lucky.” Motherboard, Drone On: the Future of UAV
Over the U.S., YOUTUBE (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwkxx84wXNo.
10

Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).

11

See Bart Jansen, FAA Has Plan for Drones, but Is Behind Schedule, USA TODAY (Dec.
2, 2013, 11:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2013/12/02/faadrones/3805447.

12

See Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. § 3119(c)
(2013).
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actors or private civilians and whether it would constitute a “search” under
the Fourth Amendment with respect to law enforcement use, or a trespass
or invasion of privacy with respect to private actors. 13 With the influx of
state regulations and increased usage by both government and civilian
actors, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly face this issue in the near
future.
[6]
This article explores the constitutionality of drone use by law
enforcement, and questions legislative findings that law enforcement’s use
of drones is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. State legislators
appear to be concerned that drone flights constitute a trespass or violate
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Part II of this article examines
current and future drone usage and the technological abilities it may have
in the future. Part III discusses safety concerns associated with drones and
what the FAA plans to do to keep the airspace of the United States safe.
Part IV examines privacy concerns related to increased drone usage, and
the mechanisms being put in place to regulate civilian and government
operators and prevent significant intrusion into privacy and governmental
abuse. In Part V, I argue that not only are legislators mistaken in believing
drone use falls under Fourth Amendment protections and should require a
warrant, but that the current analysis used to identify what types of
government investigatory tools constitute a “search” is no longer effective
as the global community is experiencing a diminished expectation of
privacy of its own doing. Less emphasis should be placed on whether a
suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy and more emphasis should
be placed on whether it would be reasonable for law enforcement to utilize
a particular investigatory tool without a warrant. The greater the intrusion
into a suspect’s private life, house, papers, and effects, the greater the
chance the Fourth Amendment is triggered and the requisite probable
cause and warrant necessary. Lastly, in Part VI, I argue that instead of
requiring probable cause and the requisite warrant, law enforcement
should seek a court order similar to the pen register statute under 18
U.S.C. § 2703. Law enforcement would be permitted to use drones if the
13

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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data to be collected is relevant to an ongoing investigation, they
demonstrate a particularized need to collect the information via drone, and
if the irrelevant data collected after the flight is subsequently destroyed
and not stored for future use.
II. CURRENT AND FUTURE DRONE USE
[7]
One of the reasons why domestic drones have become so popular
is because they serve a variety of purposes for a variety of people. Drones
are being used to inspect pipelines, survey and monitor crops, 14 monitor
storm damage and flooding, 15 monitor wildlife populations and track
poachers, 16 count sea lions in Alaska, monitor drug trafficking between
the United States and Mexico borders, monitor high crime neighborhoods
during drug investigations, monitor traffic, monitor farms for cruelty to
animals, assist realtors in marketing real estate, and conduct weather and
environmental research. 17 Drones not only assist Hollywood film makers
find cost effective ways to film scenes 18 but also assist first responders in
14

A $300 UAV could replace a $1,000 per hour manned aircraft to check for disease and
irrigation levels. Lucas Eaves, 6 Arguments in Favor of the Commercial Use of Drones,
IVN (May 6, 2013), http://ivn.us/2013/05/06/6-arguments-in-favor-of-the-commercialuse-of-drones.
15

See Airborne Drones Can Assess Storm Damage on Distribution Systems, CE
UNBOUND (May 9, 2012), http://ceunbound.com/index/webapp-storiesaction/id.914/title.airborne-drones-can-assess-storm-damage-on-distribution-systems.
16

See David Draper, Kenyan Wildlife Officials to Use Drones in War on Poaching, FIELD
NOTES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.fieldandstream.com/blogs/fieldnotes/2014/01/wildlife-officials-use-drones-combat-rhino-poaching-kenya.
17

See, e.g., Mark Corcoran, Ex-military Spy Drone to Conduct NASA Climate Tests in
Australian Airspace, ABC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-0123/us-drone-over-australia/5215598.
18

See Gary Susman, Drones and the Future of Movies, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 28, 2013,
2:50 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/movies/news/drones-and-the-future-of-movies20131028.
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search and rescue missions and during or after natural or man-made
disasters. 19 Drones also assist oil and gas companies to inspect rigs and
pipelines. 20 The Darwin Aerospace laboratory in San Francisco has even
designed the Burrito Bomber, the world’s first airborne Mexican food
delivery drone, which would allow customers to have food parachuted to
their doorsteps. 21
[8]
Drones come in all shapes and sizes. The largest drone, to date, is
the $200 million U.S. Air Force Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk,
which has the wingspan of an airliner. 22 A forty-five member ground
crew services and maintains this drone which can soar to 65,000 feet and
make non-stop thirty-five hour missions. 23 On the other end of the
spectrum, small, unsophisticated drones can be purchased at the local
hobby shop or online for the price of a smartphone. 24 Cameras can be
attached to a drone and stream video back to a tablet or smartphone, which
is operated via a Wi-Fi network generated by the drone. 25 One of the
smallest drones is the Norwegian-developed Black Hornet, which weighs
sixteen grams and “has an operational radius of more than one kilometre
19

See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.

20

See Ed Crooks, Conoco in Landmark Alaska Drone Flight, CNBC (Sept. 25, 2013,
2:09 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101060663.

21

See Rachel Janik & Mitchell Armentrout, Industry Looks to Use Drones for
Commercial Purposes, MCCLATCHY DC (April 29, 2013),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/29/189893/industry-looks-to-use-drones-for.html.

22

GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.

23

Id. The Global Hawk provided imagery over the California wildfires in 2008, the
Haitian earthquake in 2010, and the Japanese post-tsunami disaster in 2011. Id.
24

See id.

25

See id. at 6.
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and twenty-five minute endurance.” 26 A popular drone is the fixed-wing
Raven, which has “a duration of 90 minutes, a 10 kilometre operational
radius, and a maximum ceiling of 14,000 feet.” 27 The Raven can be
equipped with a sophisticated camera system and nighttime infrared
capabilities; it costs approximately $35,000 dollars. 28 The Draganflyer
drone has a flight time of twenty minutes without payload, which is a
maximum of eighteen ounces. 29 The Predator drone, on the other hand,
can carry 3,000 pounds and has an operational flight time of twenty-seven
hours. 30
[9]
Law enforcement, in particular, has caught on to the drone craze.
The Miami Police Department in Florida has drones—two Honeywell
aircraft to fly no higher than 400 feet over the everglades. 31 The U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) currently operates ten Predator drones 32
26

Id. at 7.

27

GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 10 (citing UAS: RQ-11B Raven, AEROVIRONMENT,
INC., http://www.avinc.com/uas/small_uas/raven (last visited Mar. 5, 2014)).
28

See id.

29

See Questions Many People Ask of Us, DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS, INC.,
http://www.draganfly.com/question-answers (last visited Mar. 5, 2014); X6 Technical
Overview, DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS, INC., http://www.draganfly.com/uavhelicopter/draganflyer-x6a/specifications (Mar. 5, 2014).
30

Predator® B UAS, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL, http://www.gaasi.com/products/aircraft/predator_b.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
31

JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROTECTING
PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF
DRONE AIRCRAFT 7 (2011) (citing Yochi J. Dreazen, From Pakistan, with Love: The
Technology Used to Monitor the Skies over Waziristan Is Coming to Your Hometown,
NAT’L J. (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/drones-may-becoming-to-your-hometown-20110313).
32

See Craig Whitlock & Craig Timberg, Border-Patrol Drones Being Borrowed by Other
Agencies More Often than Previously Known, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2014),

8
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and hopes to expand their number of drones to twenty-four by 2016. 33
CBP drones patrol the southern border, and the Department of Defense has
sent drones into Mexico to gather information about major drug
traffickers. 34
[10] Two “nanodrones” are currently in production and garnering
interest. The hummingbird drone “navigates by changing the angle and
shape of its paper-thin wings—which beat twenty to forty times per
second—and can hover in place for up to 11 minutes.” 35 “It is also small
enough to fly through windows or other small openings, strong enough to
carry a microphone or camera, and stable enough to maintain a highly
controlled hover, even in gusts of wind.” 36 The mosquito drone can be
remotely controlled and is equipped with a camera and a microphone. 37

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/border-patrol-drones-beingborrowed-by-other-agencies-more-often-than-previously-known/2014/01/14/5f987af07d49-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.
33

See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 31, at 6 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN INCREASED DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE ROLE IN HELPING TO SECURE THE SOUTHWEST LAND BORDER, GAO-11-856R
(Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-856R).
34

See id. at 7 (citing Ginger Thompson & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Drones Fight Mexican
Drug Trade, N. Y. TIMES, (Mar. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/world/americas/16drug.html).
35

Aerovironment Nano Hummingbird UAV, POPULAR SCIENCE,
http://www.popsci.com/bown/2011/product/aerovironment-nano-hummingbird-uav (last
visited Mar. 6, 2014).

36

Id.

37

Robert Johnson, The Future of Micro Drones Could Get Downright Scary, BUS.
INSIDER (June 20, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-future-ofmicro-drones-is-getting-pretty-scary-according-to-alan-lovejoy-2012-6.
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Once it lands, it can take a DNA sample or leave an RFID 38 tracking
device under the skin. 39
[11] Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) have used Predator drones inside the
United States. 40 FBI Director Robert Mueller commented to Congress
that drones were “very seldom used” by his agents but that he was aware
of at least three drones in FBI possession as of 2011. 41 The police
department in Mesa County, Colorado operates its Draganflyer drones in
their county. 42 Police in Arlington, Texas used drones to assist with
security during the Super Bowl in February 2011 and also for “’training
and evaluation’ purposes in unpopulated areas.” 43 The Texas Department
38

Radio frequency identification, or RFID, is a generic term for
technologies that use radio waves to automatically identify people or
objects. There are several methods of identification, but the most
common is to store a serial number that identifies a person or object,
and perhaps other information, on a microchip that is attached to an
antenna (the chip and the antenna together are called an RFID
transponder or an RFID tag). The antenna enables the chip to transmit
the identification information to a reader. The reader converts the radio
waves reflected back from the RFID tag into digital information that
can then be passed on to computers that can make use of it.
Frequently Asked Questions, RFID J., http://www.rfidjournal.com/site/faqs#AnchorWhat-363 (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
39

See Johnson, supra note 37.

40

See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 31, at 7.

41

Somini Sengupta, U.S. Border Agency Allows Others to Use Its Drones, N.Y. TIMES
(July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/business/us-border-agency-is-afrequent-lender-of-its-drones.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
42

See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 31, at 7.

43

Id. at 8.
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of Public Safety used a bird-sized “Wasp” aircraft to conduct aerial
surveillance during the execution of a search warrant. 44 The city of
Ogden, Utah, sought FAA permission in 2011 to deploy an unmanned
blimp for surveillance and crime prevention. 45 National Guard units
around the country operate drones to train for their use overseas 46 and the
United States Forest Service has been known to use drones to fly over
national parks. 47
[12] More than 300 drones have been licensed by the FAA to fly over
U.S. soil. 48 The FAA expects that number to increase to 30,000 by
2020. 49 An aerospace consulting firm estimates that the commercial drone
industry is currently worth $14 billion per year and that drones will soon
become a $90 billion industry that creates thousands of jobs in the next
decade. 50 The Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International
44

See id.

45

Id.

46

See id.

47

See Brian Skoloff & Tracie Cone, Calif. Launches Drone to Aid Wildfire Battle,
YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 28, 2013, 10:04 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/calif-launches-droneaid-wildfire-battle-211622327.html (discussing the U.S. Forest Service's use of the
Predator drone to fight the Rim Fire in Yosemite National Park).
48

See Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, EPIC.ORG,
http://epic.org/privacy/drones (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).

49

See Shaun Waterman, Drones Over U.S. Get OK by Congress, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 7,
2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/7/coming-to-a-sky-nearyou/?page=all.
50

See Clay Dillow, What Is the Drone Industry Really Worth?, CNN MONEY (Mar. 12,
2013 2:09 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/03/12/what-is-the-drone-industryreally-worth; Josh Solomon, Uncertainties Remain as FAA Integrates Drones Into
American Skies, MCCLATCHY DC (April 29, 2013),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/29/189894/uncertainties-remain-as-faaintegrates.html. For three days in August of 2013, “8,000 attendees from over 40
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(AUVSI) lobbies on behalf of the drone industry and sponsors conferences
advertising the technological advances made in drones and their variety of
uses. 51 At one of the latest drone conferences, an insurance company
advertised themselves as providing "the most comprehensive Drone
Operator Coverage and Drone Manufacturing Coverage available in the
market." 52
[13] The Pentagon cut spending on military drones from $4.8 billion in
2012 to $3.8 billion in 2013 with further reductions anticipated. 53
Initially, drones were used by the military as a reconnaissance tool, with
the D-21 drone making its first reconnaissance mission over China in
1969. 54 In 1995, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent drones on
more than 600 reconnaissance missions in the Bosnian conflict, and the
drones also provided intelligence for NATO forces in the 1999 Kosovo air
countries . . . converge[d] on Washington, D.C. for the largest international unmanned
systems conference where over 600 exhibitors consume[d] more than 350,000 square feet
of exhibit space.” Why Exhibit?, AUVSI’S UNMANNED SYSTEMS 2013,
http://www.auvsishow.org/auvsi13/public/Content.aspx?ID=1202 (last visited Mar. 10,
2014).
51

See Advocacy, AUVSI, http://www.auvsi.org/advocacy (last visited March 10, 2014).

52

Arin Greenwood, Drone Conference 2013: Unmanned Vehicle Industry Worries Word
‘Drone’ Has Negative Connotations, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013, 10:27 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/drone-convention-2013_n_3756641.html.
53

See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. Drones have been operational since 1946
when drones were sent through mushroom clouds at Bikini Atoll during nuclear testing in
order for the government to be able to sample nuclear fallout. See JACOBSEN, supra note
5, at 223. The drone operators flew the drones by remote control from an airborne
mother ship flying nearby. See id.
54

See JACOBSEN, supra note 5, at 221. The drone flew into China and over the Lop Nur
nuclear facility but then strayed off course into Soviet Siberia, ran out of fuel, and
crashed. Id. The drone was later given back to the CIA by a KGB agent in Moscow as a
gift. Id.
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campaign by “searching for targets” and “keeping an eye on KosovarAlbanian refugee camps.” 55 In January 2001, the CIA considered
assassinating Osama bin Laden with the Predator drone, but the Predator
had only been used for reconnaissance missions. 56 This was the first
occasion that the military considered using drones as a weapon rather than
as a reconnaissance tool. 57 Today, with significant military budget cuts
looming, drone manufacturers need to find a new market for their
creations.
[14] Therefore, aerospace manufacturers are looking to create a
lucrative civilian market. The chief operating officer of a Los Angelesbased company that makes operating systems for drones, Denis Clements,
remarked that the drone industry is transitioning “from all-military on a
relatively small scale to international and commercial on a large scale." 58
The AUVSI estimates that the industry will be worth $82 billion and
employ 100,000 people by 2025. 59
[15] Law enforcement, in particular, is interested in using drones as
they are typically smaller than traditional aircraft, less likely to be
detected, create less noise and vibrations, and less expensive than aircraft
and helicopters so they can afford to purchase and use more of them. 60 Of
55

Id. at 352.

56

See id. at 350.

57

See id. The new weaponized drone technology was tested at Area 51. See id. at 351.
The Predator can carry 200 pounds of weapons. See id. at 355.
58

Greenwood, supra note 52.

59

See id.

60

The Falcon UAV can fly at up to 1,500 feet and has a sixty to ninety minute
operational flight time. Information, FALCON UAV, http://www.falcon-uav.com/falconuav-info (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). The Falcon UAV can cost as little as $3.36 per
hour to operate compared to $250-$600 per hour to operate traditional aircraft. See
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course, the cost depends upon the size and sophistication of the drone, and
law enforcement need also worry about collisions and tort liability if one
of their drones collides with other aircraft or destroys personal property on
the ground.
III. ASSOCIATED SAFETY CONCERNS
[16] Who owns the airspace and who can regulate drone flights? In
early English and American common law, courts followed the rule that
whoever owned the land possessed all the space above the land extending
upwards into the heavens. 61 Much later, Congress changed that tradition
by passing the Air Commerce Act of 1926 62 and the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, 63 which granted the United States complete sovereignty over its
own airspace. Then, in 1958, the passage of the Federal Aviation Act64
gave the new Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the responsibility to
set uniform rules for the operation of aircraft in United States airspace. 65

Darrell Preston, Drones Take to American Skies on Police, Search Missions, BLOOMBERG
(May 31, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/drones-take-to-americanskies-on-police-search-missions.html.
61

See, e.g., Colin Cahoon, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56
J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 163 (1990). The ancient Latin law saying was “cujus est solum,
ejus est usque ad coelum.” Id. at 162. “It is ancient doctrine that at common law
ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe—cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad coelom. But that doctrine has no place in the modern world.” United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (citation omitted).
62

Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-251, 44 Stat. 568.

63

See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973.

64

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726; 72 Stat. 731.

65

H.R. REP. NO. 85-2360, at 1 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3741.
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[17] According to FAA regulations, fixed-wing aircraft must operate at
least “1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of
2,000 feet of the aircraft” in congested areas and “500 feet above the
surface” in non-congested areas. 66 A helicopter may fly below the
minimum safe altitudes prescribed for fixed-wing aircraft if it is operated
“without hazard to persons or property on the surface.” 67 According to a
1981 FAA advisory circular, recreational users of model aircraft may fly a
sufficient distance from populated areas and may not fly in the vicinity of
full scale aircraft, into noise-sensitive areas such as parks, schools,
hospitals, or churches, or more than 400 feet above the surface. 68
[18] Regulations mandating safe minimum operating altitudes have not
been set forth specifically for drones, and it is unclear whether some
smaller drones may fall under the 1981 advisory circular for model
aircraft. By contrast, the United Kingdom
permits private use of RPAS [remotely piloted aircraft]
under [twenty kilograms] to be flown within line of sight to
avoid collisions and the operator must maintain constant
visual contact with the aircraft. Flights less than 100 feet
above the ground are nearly free of regulation and those
between 100 and 400 feet are somewhat free for noncommercial uses, although all must comply with the basic
rules of air. Traditional flight regulations apply to all
aircraft over [twenty kilograms]. 69
66

14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b), (c) (2013).

67

14 C.F.R. § 91.119(d) (2013).

68

FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57 (1981), available at
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/91-57.pdf; see 72 Fed.
Reg. 6,689, 6,690 (Feb. 13, 2007). The guidelines are voluntary compared to FAA
regulations. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra.
69

GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 14.

15

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 3

[19] With an increase in drone usage, the biggest safety concern is the
probability of mid-air collisions. Another concern is drone malfunctions
and subsequent crashes due to third parties interfering with signals sent to
the drone, causing the operator to lose control of the aircraft. Drones
require satellites (and satellite links) to relay information to and from the
pilots who operate the drones via remote control; a drone need only be in
line of sight with its ground control station when it lands, the rest is done
via satellite link. 70 A third party could jam communications or target the
drone’s GPS link and manipulate its flight position. 71 In December 2011,
Iran alleged that it was able to hack into a U.S. government drone’s GPS
navigational controls as it was flying back to its base in Afghanistan and
had it safely land in Iran where Iranian engineers were then able to design
their own drones based off the U.S. model. 72
[20] A number of domestic drone accidents have already been reported.
Drones experience an accident rate over seven times higher than general
aviation and 353 times higher than in commercial aviation. 73
[21] Private property owners have the ability to sue the government for
any damage done to their property by government-operated drones via the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, which states that private property may
not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 74 The property
70

See JACOBSEN, supra note 5, at 358.

71

See Solomon, supra note 50.

72

See Marcus George, Iran Military Says Copying U.S. Drone, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/22/us-iran-military-droneidUSBRE83L02I20120422; Adam Rawnsley, Iran’s Alleged Drone Hack: Tough, but
Possible, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2011, 6:01 PM),
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/iran-drone-hack-gps.
73

See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 31, at 10 (citations omitted).

74

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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owners must allege that the drone flight directly and immediately
interfered with their use and enjoyment of their surface land. 75 To allege
an actionable trespass against non-government actors (who are immune
from the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause), a landowner has various
causes of actions in tort to consider, such as trespass and nuisance, and
may argue that the interference by the drone occurred within the
immediate reaches of the land or with the actual use of his land. 76
[22] To address the public’s security concerns, Congress passed the
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 77 which requires the FAA to
“develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the integration of civil
unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system” 78 by
September 30, 2015. 79 Lawmakers were concerned about drone safety
and uniformity throughout the national airspace. Specific provisions in
the “Drone Act” authorize law enforcement and other government
agencies to use drones while the FAA is crafting its regulations for
commercial use and also mandates that the drones must weigh twenty-five
pounds or less, cannot be operated higher than 400 feet above the ground

75

Id.; see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946).

76

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2) (1965) (“Flight by aircraft in the
air space above the land of another is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into the
immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it interferes substantially with
the other’s use and enjoyment of his land”).
77

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95 § 332(a)(1), 126
Stat. 11, 73 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
78

Id. The FAA’s plan must include recommendations or projections on how the
rulemaking will address the certification process for drones; drone sense and avoid
capabilities; and establishing operator or pilot standards, including a licensing and
registration system. See § 332(a)(2)(1)(A).
79

§ 332(a)(3). The law was signed by the President on February 14, 2012.
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or near airports and must remain within the naked eyesight of the
operator. 80
[23] Currently, any federal, state, or local agency wanting to operate a
drone in national airspace needs a certificate of authorization from the
FAA. 81 The FAA conducts an operational and technical review of the
drone in order to ensure citizens’ safety when the drone is in use in
national airspace. 82 Private commercial operators must receive a special
airworthiness certificate in order to operate a drone. 83
[24] While drafting new regulations, the FAA is also creating a series of
test ranges and designating specific airspace throughout the country to be
used to operate drone flights in order to develop better certification and air
traffic standards. 84 These test flights will assist the FAA in learning more
about the safe operation of drones while traveling in navigable U.S.
airspace. 85 Twenty-five applicants from twenty-four states applied to be
test sites and of those twenty-five applicants, the FAA chose Alaska,
Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Texas, and Virginia to host drone test
sites. 86
80

See Solomon, supra note 50.

81

See Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg.
6689-01 (Feb. 13, 2007) (codified at 14 C.F.R pt. 91).

82

See Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Certificates and Authorizations, FAA,
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/cert (last modified Mar. 19, 2013, 10:56 AM).

83

See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.191, 21.193 (2013); Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the
National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. at 6689-90.

84

FAA Modernization and Reform Act § 332(c).

85

FAA Selects Unmanned Aircraft Systems Research and Test Sites, FAA (Dec. 30,
2013), http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsid=15576.

86

Those states that applied to be test sites include: New York, Michigan, Ohio,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Minnesota,
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IV. ASSOCIATED PRIVACY CONCERNS
A. State Legislation
[25] Forty-five states have introduced legislation to protect privacy and
limit drone use. 87 These states seem to be singularly focused on law
enforcement’s use of drones and are not overly concerned about the
privacy ramifications as drone use increases for private, commercial and
recreational purposes. Most of the proposed state legislation allows
private citizens to bring a civil action against a government agency which
uses a drone against them but does not place any restrictions on other
private citizens who might use a drone for similar surveillance purposes. 88
Many of the bills are currently pending; twelve bills have died, been
vetoed, or are pending for further study; twelve bills have passed and
become law. 89 Additionally, Indiana has passed a resolution calling for
the creation of a committee to study the use of drones, 90 and Alaska has
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, California, Idaho,
Wyoming, Washington, and Alaska. See Map Showing State Distribution of UAS Test
Site Proposals Across the Nation, FAA,
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/UAS_testsite_map.pdf (last visited Mar.
10, 2014); see also FAA Selects Six Sites for Unmanned Aircraft Research, FAA,
http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=75399 (last modified Dec. 30, 2013).
87

See infra Tables 1-5; 2014 Status of Domestic Drone Legislation, supra note 7; 2013
Status of Domestic Drone Legislation, supra note 7.
88

See infra Tables 1-5. Only Idaho, Rhode Island, and Texas create a civil cause of
action against private citizens, and only Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, and
Texas have created criminal penalties for the authorized use of drone for surveillance. Id.
89

See infra Tables 1-5; 2014 Status of Domestic Drone Legislation, supra note 7; 2013
Status of Domestic Drone Legislation, supra note 7. States that have passed legislation
include: Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

90

S. Res. 27, 118th Gen. Assemb. 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013).
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passed a resolution to create a task force to assist the FAA in creating a
safe place for the testing of drones and the development of adequate safety
procedures for future drone use. 91
[26] Perhaps states are relying upon the common law torts of trespass,
nuisance, invasion of privacy, stalking, and harassment to keep personal
abuse in check. An individual who alleges another private individual has
invaded his privacy through the use of a drone must prove that the
defendant intruded, physically or otherwise, upon the plaintiff’s solitude
or seclusion or his private affairs or concerns and “the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.” 92 A plaintiff’s nuisance claim
would be based upon the right to use and enjoy land—it is not necessary to
show that the interference by the drone actually occupied the owner’s land
(it could fly over adjoining lands only) so long as the flight substantially
and unreasonably interfered with the use and enjoyment of the land. 93
[27] While personal drone operators are left to their own devices,
legislatures have given law enforcement strict guidelines. 94 The overall
trend of the state laws is to make the use of drones more restrictive than
what the Supreme Court currently requires for aerial surveillance. States
deem themselves proactive by adopting legislation to limit drone flights
and make the use of drones by law enforcement fall under requirements as
if the Fourth Amendment applied to their actions. Most of the current or
pending state laws do not allow the use of drones without some type of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 95
91

H.R. Con. Res. 6, 28th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013).

92

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).

93

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2) (1965).

94

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609 (2013) (requiring that law enforcement first
obtain a warrant prior to using a drone or use a drone pursuant to narrowly defined
exceptions to the statutory warrant requirement).
95

See generally infra Tables 1-5.
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[28] For example, Florida signed into law the Freedom from
Unwarranted Surveillance Act, effective July 1, 2013. 96 The new Florida
law bans local law enforcement from using drones unless they have a
warrant or there is a credible threat of a terrorist attack or if reasonable
suspicion exists to indicate “swift action is needed to prevent imminent
danger to life or serious damage to property” or “to forestall the imminent
escape of a suspect or the destruction of evidence, or to achieve purposes
including, but not limited to, facilitating the search for a missing
person.” 97 The Florida law prohibits the use of information collected by
drones in violation of the act being used as evidence in courts. 98
[29] Idaho requires law enforcement to seek a warrant to use a drone to
gather evidence unless exigent circumstances exist or the agent possesses
reasonable suspicion that, under particular circumstances, swift action to
prevent danger to life is necessary. 99
[30] Illinois requires law enforcement to seek a warrant except if the
drone will be used to prevent a terrorist attack, prevent death or serious
bodily injury, prevent escape of a suspect, or to protect evidence. 100 Law
enforcement must destroy all information obtained by the drone within
thirty days unless there is a pending investigation or trial, and agencies are
required to report to legislators annually on drone usage. 101

96

FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2013).

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (2013).

100

Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act, 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. 98-569 § 15 (West)
(codified at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167/§15).
101

Id. at §§ 20, 35.
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[31] Montana also requires a warrant or a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement in order for law enforcement to use a drone. 102
Information obtained from a drone outside the warrant process may not be
used in an affidavit for probable cause in an effort to obtain a search or
arrest warrant unless the information was obtained through monitoring
public lands or international borders. 103
[32] Oregon requires a warrant for drones unless there is a reasonable
belief that there is a threat of bodily harm or death and an affidavit is filed
within forty-eight hours of the drone use. 104 A warrant is not required if
the drone is used to reconstruct a crime scene, for search and rescue
operations, or during a declared state of emergency for public safety
purposes only. 105 Drones may not be weaponized. 106
[33] Tennessee requires that “no law enforcement agency shall use a
drone to gather evidence or other information” except in the event of a
terrorist risk or attack, the existence of a warrant, reasonable suspicion to
prevent an imminent danger to life, or if law enforcement is searching for
a fugitive or monitoring a hostage, or missing person. 107 No data collected
from the drone may be used, copied, or disclosed. 108 Any data must be
deleted within twenty-four hours after collection. 109
102

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-109 (2014 Supp.).

103

Id.

104

OR. REV. STAT. § 837.335 (2013 Supp.).

105

§ 837.340.

106

See § 837.365.

107

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609 (Supp. 2013).

108

Id.

109

Id.

22

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 3

[34] Texas outlaws drone use unless it falls under one of several
exceptions. 110 Law enforcement in particular may use drones “pursuant to
a valid search or arrest warrant;” if law enforcement is “in immediate
pursuit of a person law enforcement officers have reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to suspect has committed an offense;” “for the purpose of
documenting a crime scene;” “for the purpose of investigating the scene of
[] a human fatality; [] a motor vehicle accident causing death or serious
bodily injury to a person;” “in connection with the search for a missing
person;” or “for the purpose of conducting a high-risk tactical operation
that poses a threat to human life.” 111
[35] Virginia is the most restrictive state and does not allow for a
warrant to grant the use of drones. 112 However, drones can be used for
Amber Alerts, Senior Alerts, 113 Blue Alerts, 114 search or rescue
operations, or training exercises. 115
Idaho and Texas are unique in that they have passed bills that
regulate drone surveillance by public and private parties. The Texas
legislation provides at least nineteen circumstances when drone use is
permitted, for example, by real estate brokers “in connection with the
marketing, sale or financing of real property,” oil and gas companies for
“inspecting, maintaining, or repairing pipelines,” and utility companies for
[36]

110

See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.002 (West 2013 Supp.).

111

Id.

112

H.R. 2012, 2013 Sess. (Va. 2013).

113

A Senior Alert is a message sent to the public when a senior adult is reported missing.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 52-34.6 (2013 Supp.).
114

Blue Alert is a message sent to the public in the event that either a dangerous suspect
or convict has escaped police custody or that a law enforcement officer is missing under
circumstances that raise concern for the officer’s safety. See § 52-34.9.
115

H.R. 2012.
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“assessing vegetation growth for the purpose of maintaining clearances on
utility easements.” 116
[37] Legislation is currently pending in: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia. 117
[38] The following states’ bills are very similar to the legislation
already passed in the states previously mentioned. Alabama’s bill, S.B.
317, the Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act, is indefinitely postponed
in the Senate. 118 Arizona’s bill, H.B. 2574, passed the house committee,
but is not law. 119 Arizona’s bill would require a search warrant before law
enforcement could use a drone to “gather, store or collect evidence of any
type, including audio or video recordings,” and the search warrant must
include the citizen’s name. 120 The bill makes an exception if the drone
was used to enforce state drug or smuggling laws on public land or on
private land with the consent of the landowner. 121 A citizen could
lawfully own and operate a drone but could not use it to “monitor other
116

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.002 (West 2013); see also Timothy B. Lee, Can State
Laws Protect You from Being Watched by Drones?, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/18/can-state-laws-protectyou-from-being-watched-by-drones (last updated June 18, 2013).
117

See infra Tables 1-5.

118

See History for SB317,
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACTIONHistoryResultsMac.asp?OID=80688&
LABEL=SB317 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014) (Alison, Alabama Legislative Information
System Online).

119

H.B. 2574, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013).

120

Id.

121

See id.
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persons inside their homes or places of worship or within the closed
confines of their property or other locations where a person would have an
expectation of privacy.” 122
[39] Arkansas House Bill 1904 would make it unlawful for law
enforcement to operate a drone unless they have consent, a search warrant,
an emergency situation (immediate danger or serious bodily injury), or
conspiratorial activities threatening national security or organized
crime. 123
[40] California’s bill, S.B. 15, is currently in committee and requires a
search warrant unless there is an exception to the search warrant such as
exigent circumstances. 124 Georgia S.B. 200 would require a warrant for
government drone use unless exigent circumstances exist. 125
[41] Maine’s bill passed both chambers but was vetoed by the
Governor, and the veto was sustained. 126 The legislation would have
required either a warrant or an emergency situation, with a sworn
statement explaining the emergency filed with the court no later than
forty-eight hours after the drone flight. 127 The information collected by

122

Id.

123

H.B. 1904, 89th Gen. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).

124

S.B. 15, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).

125

S.B. 200, 152nd Gen. Ass., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013).

126

See Summary of LD 236, ST. ME LEGIS.,
www.mainelegislature.org/LAWMAKERWEB/summary.asp?ID=280046602 (last
visited Mar. 24, 2014).
127

Id.
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the drone needed to be destroyed after forty-eight hours unless an
investigation or trial was pending. 128
[42] The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was quick to weigh
in on the privacy discussion and recommended that drones deploy only
with a warrant, in an emergency, or when specific and articulable grounds
to believe that the drone will collect evidence relating to a specific
criminal act exist.129 Law enforcement should only retain images when
there is reasonable suspicion that they contain evidence of a crime or are
relevant to an ongoing investigation or trial. 130 The ACLU argues that the
usage policy of drones should be decided democratically rather than by
police departments, and that policies are clear, written, and open to the
public. 131 Moreover, they insist that the use of drones be subject to open
audits and proper oversight to prevent misuse. 132
B. Federal Legislation
[43] On the federal level, Rep. Ted Poe (R-Tex.) of the Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security introduced the Preserving
American Privacy Act of 2013, 133 which would prohibit drone use by law

128

Id. The bill would have permitted courts to extend the order up to thirty days where a
court determined it was necessary to achieve the purposes for which the order was
granted. Id.
129

See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 31, at 15.

130

See id. at 16.

131

See id.

132

See id.

133

See Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. (2013); see
also Marshall Cohen, Push in Congress to Protect Privacy Amid Growth in Drone Use,
MCCLATCHYDC (Apr. 29, 2013) http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/29/189895/push-
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enforcement outside the parameters of the legislation and protects private
citizens against certain “covered information” collected by drones. 134 The
Act defines “covered information” as “information that is reasonably
likely to enable identification of an individual; or [] information about an
individual’s property that is not in plain view.” 135 Law enforcement may
operate a drone and collect “covered information” pursuant to a warrant
based upon probable cause. 136 No later than ten days after the execution
of the warrant, the governmental entity that sought the warrant must
“serve a copy of the warrant on each person on whom covered information
was collected, except, if providing such notice would seriously jeopardize
an ongoing criminal or national security investigation, the court may delay
such notice on request of the governmental entity.” 137
[44] Under the Act, if law enforcement wishes to operate a drone in a
“stipulated public area,” they may seek a court order based upon a
showing of “a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a reasonable
probability that the operation of a public unmanned aircraft system will

in-congress-to-protect-privacy.html (noting that the AUVSI drone lobby spent $60,000
lobbying against the bill in 2012).
134

H.R. 637 §§ 3119a(2)(a)(b), 3119b(a); see also Protecting the 4th Amendment, TED
POE: U.S. CONGRESSMAN 2ND DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Jan. 3, 2014, 12:12 PM)
http://poe.house.gov/key-issue-rationale/protecting-the-4th-amendment/ (noting that on
April 8, 2013, the Act “was referred to the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
Homeland Security, and Investigations” and that “[a] subject matter hearing was also
held in this subcommittee.”).
135

H.R. 637, § 3119a(2)(A), (B). It is unclear whether the legislators mean plain view
from the air or within plain view at ground level. The definition of “covered
information” appears to cover anything seen during aerial surveillance.
136

See id. at § 3119c(c)(1)(A).

137

Id. at § 3119c(c)(1)(B).
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provide evidence of such criminal activity.” 138 The court order may only
authorize the operation of the drone “in a stipulated public area for a
period of not more than [forty-eight] hours” 139 “which may be renewed at
the court’s discretion for a total period of operation of not longer than
[thirty] days.” 140 Ten days after the termination of the court order, law
enforcement must “serve a copy on each person on whom covered
information was collected” 141 or not less than forty-eight hours prior to
such operation, law enforcement must notify the public in the stipulated
public area, of such operation “in a major publication (with circulation of
more than 1,000 in that area); [] on a public Internet Web site of the
governmental entity, for the duration of the operation; or [] on public
signage in the area, for the duration of the operation.” 142
[45] There are limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. Law
enforcement may use drones outside the warrant requirement if “[t]he
operation is within a distance of [twenty-five] miles from any external
land boundary of the United States and is for the purpose of patrolling or
138

Id. at § 3119c(c)(2)(A). The ACLU has interpreted the Act to mean that police are
required “to get a warrant based on probable cause before launching a drone to search a
non-public area” and reasonable suspicion to search a public area. See Sandra Fulton,
Experts Discuss Surveillance at Domestic Drones Hearing, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION
(May. 17, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-nationalsecurity/experts-discuss-surveillance-society-domestic-drones.
139

H.R. 637, § 3119c(c)(2)(B). A “stipulated public area” is not defined in the bill. It is
unclear whether curtilage would be considered a private or public area.
140

Id. at § 3119c(c)(2)(C).

141

Id. at § 3119c(c)(2)(D)(i). Requiring notice to each person on whom “covered
information” was collected could become a daunting task for law enforcement. A drone
may very likely collect information that is “reasonably likely to enable identification of
an individual” and many people may need to be notified. Is the notice requirement
necessary if the data collected must be discarded within a specific period of time and will
not be used against the individual in future criminal proceedings?
142

Id. at § 3119c(c)(2)(D)(ii)(I)-(III).
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securing the border;” 143 if “[t]he covered information that is collected or
disclosed pertains to an individual who provides prior written consent to
such collection or disclosure;” 144 or if an emergency exists which involves
“immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person; []
conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest; or []
conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime.” 145 In the case
of an emergency, the agent must apply for a warrant or order no later than
forty-eight hours after the drone operation begins. 146
[46] As for the private use of drones, the Act includes a paparazzi
provision making it unlawful to intentionally operate a drone in a “manner
that is highly offensive to a reasonable person” or to monitor persons
engaging in personal or familial activities, when a reasonable expectation
of privacy exists, and regardless of whether a physical trespass exists.147
The Act also bans the weaponization of drones whether by law
enforcement or private persons. 148
[47] Other pending federal legislation includes the Preserving Freedom
from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, 149 which prohibits the use of
a drone to gather evidence of criminal conduct except as to the extent
authorized by a warrant. 150 Exceptions to the warrant requirement would
143

Id. at § 3119c(c)(3).

144

H.R. 637, § 3119c(c)(4).

145

Id. at § 3119c(c)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(III).

146

Id. at § 3119c(c)(5)(B).

147

Id. at § 3119f.

148

Id. at § 3119h.

149

Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, H.R. 972, 113th
Cong. (2013).
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include: patrolling United States borders, exigent circumstances, and
situations entailing a high risk of a terrorist attack. 151 The Act restricts the
use of drones more than Fourth Amendment jurisprudence currently
requires for a fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter. The Drone Aircraft
Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013 152 and Safeguarding Privacy and
Fostering Aerospace Innovation Act of 2013 153 are two additional bills up
for consideration before Congress.
V. INVESTIGATORY METHODS AND FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS
[48] It is clear from the recently passed and currently pending state and
federal legislation on drones that the biggest concern lies in law
enforcement’s use of drones for criminal investigative activities.
Legislators fear we are one step closer to a 24-hour surveillance state and
have chosen to pass laws restricting law enforcement’s use without much
thought as to the Fourth Amendment and what exactly it protects against.
In the past, legislators have waited for a Supreme Court decision before
acting. For example, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement
needed a warrant before electronically eavesdropping on someone’s
conversation in 1967; 154 Congress then passed the federal wiretap statute,
18 U.S.C. § 2511. 155 In another instance, the Court held that law
enforcement’s requests of the telephone company for real-time collection
150

Id. at § 2.

151

Id. at § 3.

152

Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 1262, 113th Cong.
(2013).
153

Safeguarding Privacy and Fostering Aerospace Innovation Act, S. 1057, 113th Cong.
(2013).
154

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).

155

See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012).
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of a target’s telephone numbers received and dialed did not trigger the
Fourth Amendment; 156 Congress subsequently passed the pen register
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3121, and required a court order. 157 Lastly, the Court
held that an arrestee must be advised of his or her rights against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment before interrogation;158
Congress subsequently passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501, essentially attempting to
overturn the Miranda decision. 159
[49] This proactive stance by state and federal legislatures and their
aversion to drone use is a bit troubling, and appears to be a knee-jerk
reaction to the idea of a “drone surveillance state.” Legislators have not
fully explored which law enforcement investigatory tools trigger Fourth
Amendment protections and which ones do not, and have not considered
the ramifications of their hastily drafted laws.
[50] Law enforcement has a select group of investigatory tools it can
use without triggering Fourth Amendment protections. Surveillance of
suspects is one of the oldest tools that law enforcement has used to collect
information and determine whether criminal activity is occurring. 160 It is
one of the first steps of any criminal investigation. The idea that a warrant
would be needed to surveil a suspect would effectively cripple any
investigation before it even got off the ground.

156

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).

157

See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2012).

158

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).

159

See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012).

160

See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding that police
surveillance in areas generally observable by the public did not trigger Fourth
Amendment protection).
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[51] Only a certain number of investigatory tools are given Fourth
Amendment protection. If all investigatory tools were outside the Fourth
Amendment, then it would be virtually impossible for law enforcement to
ever gain probable cause to seek a warrant. Therefore, law enforcement
requires methods and tools that are permissible under Fourth Amendment
protections in order to allow for the collection of sufficient information to
use as probable cause for an arrest, search, or warrant for other, more
intrusive investigatory tools.
[52] During the investigative stage, law enforcement can request voice
exemplars 161 and handwriting samples 162 from suspects, request
information from third parties via subpoena, 163 utilize informants to gather
information on the suspect, 164 sort through the suspect’s trash that has
been discarded and abandoned, 165 walk in open fields 166 to inspect a
marijuana grow operation or a barn converted into a methamphetamine
lab, surveil suspects in public places via CCTV 167 video cameras, monitor
suspects while observing from a motor vehicle, aircraft or helicopter, 168 or
have a K-9 sniff the suspect’s luggage 169 or car 170 in order to detect the
161

See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973).

162

See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).

163

See SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984).

164

See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966).

165

See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-43 (1988).

166

See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (quoting Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)).

167

Closed-circuit television.

168

See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213-14 (1986).
169

See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
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presence of contraband—all outside any constitutional protection the
suspect might have. However, in the past few years, the Court has begun
to place additional limits on several of these heretofore lawful,
investigatory tools which have been reevaluated from a Fourth
Amendment perspective during the appeals process.
[53] In United States v. Jones, the Court determined that law
enforcement needed a warrant to place a GPS device on the suspect’s
motor vehicle regardless of whether they intended to monitor the vehicle
in public or private areas. 171 Also in Jones, Justice Sotomayor, in her
concurring opinion, challenged the legality of the third party doctrine (the
use of gathering information of the suspect that is in the hands of third
parties via subpoena) and argued the Court should revisit this doctrine—
namely positing that law enforcement should need more than a subpoena
to request bank records, e-mail subscriber information, or phone numbers
dialed. 172 In Florida v. Jardines, the Court held that law enforcement
could not use K-9s to sniff the exterior of one’s home to detect the
presence of narcotics. 173 While a dog sniff of a car and a dog sniff of a
suitcase or person in an airport were deemed acceptable, a dog sniff
around the home became too intrusive and required a warrant. 174 Aerial
surveillance is similarly being scrutinized once again and is at risk of
being moved from the outside the Fourth Amendment category to within
Fourth Amendment protections as drone use is evaluated. The question
becomes: has the progression from using planes to helicopters to drones
170

See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).

171

See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

172

See id. at 956-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

173

See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013).

174

See id. at 1417-18 (“The government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the
home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”).

33

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 3

for surveillance purposes become much more intrusive and, therefore,
should drone surveillance trigger the protections of the Fourth
Amendment?
[54] A common defense strategy in criminal proceedings is to challenge
the law enforcement investigatory tool used to collect evidence. Defense
attorneys typically argue that a particular technique or tool violates their
client’s Fourth Amendment rights, that is, “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” 175 Some law enforcement techniques only fall
under Fourth Amendment protection in specific circumstances, e.g., when
the technique is deemed to be overly invasive or the suspect has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in this particular instance. 176 If law
enforcement were to examine a suspect’s e-mail or phone call content, 177
or electronically wiretap a particular phone, 178 enter the home or curtilage
of the suspect’s house, 179 look into the home using thermal imaging, 180
request fingernail scrapings, 181 extract blood, 182 or have a bullet surgically
175

U.S. CONST. amend IV.

176

See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2000) (holding that using
uncommon devices like Thermovision to “explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion” constitute a “search” under
the Fourth Amendment).
177

But cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that a warrant is not
required if law enforcement is only collecting the phone numbers received or dialed by
the target phone).
178

See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-59 (1967).

179

See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180-81 (1984).

180

See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.

181

See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973).

182

See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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removed from a suspect, 183 the Fourth Amendment has been triggered.
The Fourth Amendment has two requirements/clauses: that the search be
reasonable 184 and that the warrant contain probable cause. 185 Therefore,
once the Fourth Amendment is triggered, investigators seek a warrant to
counter any potential Fourth Amendment claims by the suspect made at a
later date. If they do not seek a warrant, law enforcement must allege that
a specific exception to the warrant requirement applies. 186
[55] State legislatures have proceeded with the assumption that drone
surveillance falls under Fourth Amendment protections and, therefore, law
enforcement must obtain a warrant or show exigent circumstances exist
(e.g., threat of a terrorist attack or reasonable suspicion of imminent
danger to a person’s life) before the use of this technique. This
assumption is not necessarily justified.
A. Aerial Surveillance
Protections.

is

Outside

Fourth

Amendment

[56] The Fourth Amendment applies to government searches and
seizures. The Supreme Court determines whether the government action
constitutes a search, such that the action violates one’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, 187 or if the action constitutes a trespass. 188 In three
cases, the Supreme Court ruled that aerial surveillance does not trigger the
Fourth Amendment. In California v. Ciraolo, the Court determined that
183

See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765 (1985).

184

U.S. CONST. amend IV; see, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Ct. S. F., 387 U.S. 523, 534-35
(1967).

185

U.S. CONST. amend IV; see, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35.

186

See Camara, 387 U.S. at 529-30.

187

See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

188

See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012).

35

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 3

law enforcement’s observation of a marijuana grow in the defendant’s
back yard from a fixed-wing aircraft flying at 1000 feet was not a Fourth
Amendment search. 189 “[T]he home and its curtilage are not necessarily
protected from inspection that involves no physical invasion.” 190 Law
enforcement was within FAA regulations for fixed-wing aircraft—and
since the public was able to fly in the same navigable airspace and see the
yard with the naked eye from an altitude of 1000 feet, observations during
the flight did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. 191
In essence, Ciraolo had no reasonable expectation of privacy since anyone
could take a plane ride and view him in his yard below, and there was no
trespass because FAA regulations permits planes to fly within that
airspace.
[57] In Florida v. Riley, the Court found that observation from a
helicopter flying at 400 feet was also not a Fourth Amendment search. 192
Flying at 400 feet was within current FAA regulations and any member of
the public could have done the same. 193 Riley failed to show “that
helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare . . . to lend substance to
[Riley’s] claim that he reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would
not be subject to observation from that altitude.” 194
[58] In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Environmental
Protection Agency had an aerial photographer take pictures of Dow’s
189

See California v. Ciarolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).

190

Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (explaining the Court’s reasoning in
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207).
191

See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.

192

See Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.

193

See id. at 451.

194

Id. at 451-452.
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manufacturing facility while within navigable airspace. 195 The Court held
that the open areas surrounding Dow’s industrial facility were similar to
“open fields” and were “open to the view and observation of persons in
aircraft lawfully in the public airspace immediately above or sufficiently
near the area for the reach of cameras.” 196 The taking of the aerial
photographs did not constitute a “search” prohibited under the Fourth
Amendment, as “[a]ny person with an airplane and an aerial camera could
readily duplicate” the photographs that were taken. 197
[59] If law enforcement drones are flown within FAA regulated
navigable airspace, and civilians have the opportunity to fly their own
drones commercially and privately in the same airspace, why would law
enforcement need a warrant? Is it because law enforcement uses its
drones for criminal investigatory purposes, whereas a realtor uses his
drone to take pictures of the area, a filmmaker to make a movie, a wildlife
organization to monitor animals at the zoo or nature preserve, or a nosy
homeowner who wants to spy on a neighbor’s outdoor activities?
Understandably, the Fourth Amendment only protects citizens from
government intrusion. 198 However, if a private investigator, or a neighbor,
or even a criminal actor can utilize a drone to surveil the local law
enforcement agency building, why should local law enforcement be
unable to do the same? Moreover, the information gathered by law
enforcement for a criminal investigation via drone technology would be
less intrusive and less accessed than information gathered by a realtor in
order to publish a full page advertisement in a local newspaper or
magazine or by others who wish to use drones for other purposes.

195

See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).

196

Id. at 239.

197

Id. at 231.

198

See, e.g., Guide for Users, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1, 3-4.
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B.
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Tools:
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Trespass
[60] The Supreme Court has done a good job in the past monitoring the
grey area that surrounds the boundary between what constitutes a “search”
and what does not constitute a “search.” It uses the tools of trespass and
what is considered a reasonable expectation of privacy to determine on
what side law enforcement’s actions fall. 199 Trespass was a long forgotten
tool that recently gathered steam after the Jones decision. A physical
intrusion of a person, house, paper, or effect is deemed a “search.”200
Thus, the F.B.I.’s placement of a GPS tracker on Jones’ vehicle was
deemed a trespass of an “effect” and a Fourth Amendment “search,” thus
requiring a warrant. 201 The physical intrusion of a spike mike into the
heating ducts of a suspect’s apartment constituted a “search” in Silverman
v. United States. 202 The physical intrusion into Ms. Mapp’s home without
a valid warrant in Mapp v. Ohio constituted a “search” in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 203
[61] The second tool the Court uses to determine what constitutes a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment is to subject the law enforcement
action to a Katz analysis. 204 If law enforcement’s action violates the
suspect’s expectation of privacy and society is prepared to recognize that
expectation as reasonable, then law enforcement’s action constitutes a
199

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
200

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-50.

201

Id. at 946.

202

Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961).

203

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).

204

Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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“search.” 205 Thus a “search” is an action by the government that intrudes,
however slightly, upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The
Katz analysis was originally designed to resolve issues arising from virtual
intrusions rather than physical intrusions of a person, house, paper, or
effect. Katz’s conversation was silently monitored and listened to outside
his physical presence, and it was a stretch to argue that the listening device
taped to the top of the telephone booth constituted a “trespass.” 206 The
Court was more concerned about the violation of Katz’s privacy stemming
from law enforcement’s uninvited ear rather than the physical trespass of
the listening device, albeit slightly. 207 Many believed trespass was no
longer the mechanism by which the Court determined what constituted a
“search.” However, the Supreme Court corrected this misinterpretation in
Jones by stating that Katz merely supplements trespass—therefore, the
Court can use either trespass and/or the Katz analysis to determine what
actions constitute a “search.” 208
[62] The Court has used these two theories to determine if a particular
law enforcement action triggers Fourth Amendment protections. The
utilization of a thermal imaging device in Kyllo v. United States 209 was
found to constitute a “search” because it violated the suspect’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in the home and because these types of thermal
imaging devices were not generally available to the public. 210 The Court
has drawn a clear line that anything intruding into the home, physically,
virtually, or otherwise constitutes a “search.” The warrantless entry and
205

Id.

206

Id. at 370 (Black, J., dissenting).

207

Id. at 353.

208

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).

209

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000).

210

See id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

39

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 3

search of a home is “the chief evil against which . . . the Fourth
Amendment is directed.” 211 “‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment
‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable government intrusion.’” 212
Curtilage, the area
immediately surrounding a dwelling in which the intimate, daily activities
of family life are conducted, is also protected. 213 The Court has reasoned
that citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they conduct
activities in their front, side, and back yards. 214 Therefore, the intrusion of
a police-trained K-9 sniffing a suspect’s front door for the presence of
narcotics violates that suspect’s expectation of privacy because the K-9 is
within the curtilage and is not acting similar to a visitor or salesman
soliciting at the front door. 215 The Fourth Amendment does not protect
open fields outside the curtilage. 216 Under the plain view doctrine, what a

211

Id. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court of E. Dist.
of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
212

Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).

213

See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).

214

In United States v. Dunn, the Court identified four factors to determine what areas
surrounding the home fall into the category of curtilage:
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home,
the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by
the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.
480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (citations omitted).
215

See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013).

216

See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).
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person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not granted Fourth Amendment protection. 217
[63] Arguably, drone surveillance falls into this grey area. Aircraft and
helicopters that fly within FAA-regulated navigable airspace and monitor
suspects’ activities in public areas fall outside the Fourth Amendment. It
is unclear why drones that also fly within FAA regulated navigable
airspace and monitor suspects’ activities in public areas would not also fall
outside the Fourth Amendment. Where is the trespass? As mentioned
previously, owners can no longer claim they own the space above their
land—flying machines in navigable airspace are not deemed to be
trespassing. Drones flying within FAA regulations at 1,000 feet for
airplanes will be unable to see inside citizens’ homes. 218 If we apply the
FAA circular guidelines, small drones that weigh twenty-five pounds or
less cannot be operated higher than 400 feet above the ground, must
remain within the naked eyesight of the operator, and must fly a sufficient
distance from populated areas. 219 Therefore, drones would not be used at
less than 400 feet in populated areas to peer in property owners’ windows.
If a drone flies outside the navigable airspace or outside the naked
eyesight of the operator in a populated area in the case of a small drone,
then the action could be deemed a trespass and a “search.” This alleviates
any concern that drones will be used to lurk in backyards and spy through
bedroom windows to capture intimate activities associated with the home.
A drone might be able to see rooftops and backyard gardens or pools but
from its aerial vantage viewpoint, it would not be able to see through
windows and curtains unless it is flying at that level (which is not
permissible via current FAA guidelines for model aircraft). Drones will
be able to view activities within the curtilage if not covered, but so can
217

See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 213 (1966).
218

Robert Molko, The Drones Are Coming!: Will the Fourth Amendment Stop Their
Threat to Our Privacy?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1279 (2013).
219

See supra text accompanying note 80.
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aircraft and helicopters. Therefore, it is unclear why drone use would
constitute a trespass or be more intrusive than an aircraft or helicopter.
[64] Does drone use by law enforcement violate a suspect’s reasonable
expectation of privacy? Drones have the ability to capture images of a
suspect and his outdoor activities. The pictures taken from drones may or
may not be of better quality than those taken from an aircraft or helicopter,
depending upon the sophistication and quality of the particular drone.
Thus, it would be difficult to argue the images captured from law
enforcement drones violate one’s right to privacy as similar technology is
available to the public and the government.
[65] Does the fact that some sophisticated drones have the ability to
stay in the air and monitor a suspect’s activities for several hours create a
situation where the suspect’s privacy is violated? Boeing is in the process
of designing a hydrogen-powered drone called the “Phantom Eye,” a
“high altitude, long endurance Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) with a 270
nm sensing line-of-sight, at 65,000 feet for up to 10 days without
refueling.” 220 The Court in Jones seemed to be concerned about this very
thing—the closer technology moves towards twenty-four hour constant
surveillance, the greater the possibility the technology is intruding into our
right to privacy. 221 Justice Alito explained that “the use of longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy. . . In this case, for four weeks, law enforcement
agents tracked every movement that respondent made in the vehicle he
was driving.” 222

220

Arin Greenwood, Drone Conference 2013: Unmanned Vehicle Industry Worries Word
'Drone' Has Negative Connotations, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/drone-convention-2013_n_3756641.html.
221

See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).

222

Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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[66] Most drones cannot stay in the air for more than an hour (with a
few lasting perhaps for a day) before needing to land and refuel. 223 Unlike
GPS tracking, drones still require a flight operator at all times. Drones
may be easier to utilize compared to traditional aircraft but they are still
more manpower-intensive than a GPS tracking device placed on a motor
vehicle where data can be checked and downloaded every few days.
C. Right to Privacy Under the Due Process Clause versus the
Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Under the
Fourth Amendment
[67] Assuming that drones could monitor our activities 24/7 once we
step out of our homes, how would that constitute a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment? In Jones, Justice Sotomayor argued that the
government’s 24/7 collection of data from GPS trackers would add up to a
“search” because the person’s right to privacy had been violated under the
Fourth Amendment. Oftentimes, in the drone context, a similar argument
is made that the Fourth Amendment guarantees its citizens a right to
privacy and that the 24/7 monitoring by drones would violate our right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment. However, the right to privacy
stems from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
states: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” 224 Substantive due process generally bars
223

Most drones can last from a few minutes to an hour in flying time; the more expensive
and sophisticated drones, such as the Global Hawk or Predator, can last more than a day
in the air. See Kara Plantoni, “That’s Professor Global Hawk: A Remote-Piloted
Warrior Starts Flying for Science, AIR & SPACE MAG.,
http://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/thats-professor-global-hawk-433583/?no-ist
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014); see also Global Hawk—Performance and Specifications,
NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/aircraft/GlobalHawk/performance.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2014); Predator B UAS, GEN. ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL, http://www.gaasi.com/products/aircraft/predator_b.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
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federal and state governments from depriving anyone’s life, liberty, or
property by means of a law found to be arbitrary and/or unreasonable. 225
The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee a right to privacy, rather it
adds to the privacy analysis in the criminal procedural context by placing
certain restrictions on law enforcement actions.
[68] Privacy rights have their foundations rooted in family law, rather
than in criminal procedure.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 226 Griswold v.
Connecticut, 227 and Lawrence v. Texas 228 were significant family law
cases that recognized a constitutional right to privacy under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 229 In 1923, Meyer
challenged a Nebraska statute that prohibited any person from teaching
languages other than English, except to pupils who had successfully
completed the eighth grade and classified a violation as a misdemeanor. 230
The Court found that Meyer had a right to teach German to a ten-year-old
child under the Fourteenth Amendment:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness
the liberty thus guaranteed, . . . [w]ithout doubt, it denotes
224

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

225

See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
226

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

227

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

228

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

229

“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
230

See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396.
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not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. . . . Determination by the
legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police
power is not final or conclusive but is subject to
supervision by the courts. 231
[69]

In 1965, the Court in Griswold further explained that:
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance. . . . Various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra 232 of the First Amendment is one, as we have
seen. . . . The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” 233

231

Id. at 399-400 (citations omitted).

232

According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, a penumbra is “a space of partial
illumination (as in an eclipse) between the perfect shadow on all sides and the full
light.”Penumbra Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/penumbra (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
233

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
In Griswold, the appellants argued a criminal statute prohibiting persons from giving
information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of preventing
conception was unconstitutional via the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 484-85.
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Justice Black, in his Griswold dissent, stated, “I like my privacy as well as
the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government
has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional
provision.” 234
[70] Justice Stewart, also dissenting in Griswold, stated, “With all
deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights,
in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by
this Court.” 235 Lastly, in 2003, the plaintiff in Lawrence argued that a
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage
in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional and violated one’s
right to privacy. 236 The Court stated that:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our
tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And
there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside
the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. 237
Thus, the Texas statute furthered “no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.” 238

234

Id. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting).

235

Id. at 530.

236

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003).

237

Id. at 562.

238

Id. at 578.
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[71] In essence, the Due Process Clause created the model by which the
government cannot create laws infringing on our personal freedoms.
However, the Fourth Amendment has a different goal. With a general
right to privacy already established under the Due Process Clause, the
Fourth Amendment focuses on the limits on the government’s ability to
investigate and enforce criminal laws. As we exercise our right to be free,
the government cannot unreasonably monitor us for criminal activity
without good cause and it cannot be unduly intrusive. Thus, the
government must perform a balancing test—balancing our right to privacy
against our need to be monitored to prevent criminal activity and harm to
society from occurring. Therefore, we may have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the collection of data 24/7, but the question under the Fourth
Amendment is not whether we have an expectation of privacy, but
whether the government’s action is unreasonable.
[72] The European Convention on Human Rights explains the
intersection between this right to privacy and the government’s need to
monitor:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 239
[73] Thus, under the Due Process Clause, the government does not have
the right to interfere with our right to be free, to express ourselves as we
239

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2309.
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choose, and to keep our private lives private, separate and apart from
government interference. Law enforcement should not intrude into our
private lives unless they have sufficient justification to do so, and their
justification must be deemed reasonable. A bird’s eye view of our actions
outside our homes, mowing the lawn, driving to appointments, running
errands, driving to work, daycare, or social events, or working in the
garden are all actions we have the right to do under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause—but we have no inviolate expectation
that knowledge of these activities will be kept private. The Fourth
Amendment is triggered only in our private spaces when the intrusion into
our privacy is so great that it outweighs the government’s justification for
doing so. The Court has drawn the line between government monitoring
of public areas and private areas. The government interferes with our
right to privacy when our private spaces are violated. Drones, unless
equipped with thermal imaging, infrared, or highly sophisticated and
intrusive technology, would not interfere and intrude into private spaces.
Therefore, we may have an expectation of privacy that we will not be
monitored in public spaces, but it is reasonable for the government to do
so. In graphic form, the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment
would look as follows:
The Due Process Clause:

The Fourth Amendment:
Reasonable
Government
Action = NO
Warrant
Requirement
(Minimal Privacy)

Fundamental
Freedoms, including
Right to Privacy

Unreasonable
Government
Action =
Warrant
Requirement
(Zone of Privacy
Exists)

[74] The Due Process Clause establishes our right to privacy, and the
Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement intrusion into our privacy if
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that intrusion is reasonable. The concern that government surveillance
may reveal where we eat, when we go to the gynecologist, where we go to
church, who we visit, etc. and that, therefore, the Fourth Amendment’s
right to privacy is triggered, is only the first step in a Fourth Amendment
analysis. One more question must be asked. The Due Process Clause
gives us a right to do these things without government intrusion, but the
question then becomes whether the surveillance tool law enforcement used
was reasonable. The government needs the ability to perform its duties to
protect its citizens and have the mechanisms by which to do so. Do we
deem this type of monitoring of our actions reasonable? If so, then no
warrant is required. If not, then the Fourth Amendment is triggered and a
warrant is required.
[75] Many of the activities we are free to do are no longer considered
“private.” As Justice Alito points out in Jones:
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this
hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and
stable set of privacy expectations. But technology can
change those expectations. Dramatic technological change
may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in
flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in
popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and
many people find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the
public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that
new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile
themselves to this development as inevitable. 240
Less emphasis needs to be placed on privacy and more emphasis must be
placed on whether the tool used is reasonable.

240

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J. concurring).
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[76] Moreover, our right to privacy has been diminished by our own
desires to use drones for our own personal use. Fewer and fewer
investigatory tools are deemed intrusive (and violate our right to privacy)
as we, as a society, have deliberately exposed our once private lives into
the public arena. Once our thoughts, photographs, and private information
are placed on third party, public sites, it is unreasonable to ask law
enforcement not to look at them. 241 If we deem it reasonable that private,
third parties may view the data we disclose, then we must deem it
reasonable for law enforcement to examine it. A third party’s reason for
viewing may be different from law enforcement’s reason, but the concern
is not the purpose for which it is viewed, it is the concern that it violates
our right to privacy. Therefore, the privacy debate is diminished because
we, as a society, have let it become diminished through our own actions
towards greater public exposure. We have decided that being seen and
heard is more important than keeping our private actions private.
VI. THE REAL FEAR BEHIND DRONE USE: GOVERNMENT ABUSE
[77] If privacy is not the real concern behind drone use, perhaps it is the
fear of law enforcement abuse. If law enforcement uses drone technology
to target particular areas of the community and randomly “search for
crime,” is there another way to keep law enforcement in check than to say
drone use automatically triggers the Fourth Amendment and requires a
warrant? General crime monitoring has never been considered an
acceptable practice by the Court. 242 Drones should be used only for
investigations of specific targets, not merely to “look for crime.” Citizens
of the United States do not want to become citizens of the next Soviet
Union where agents and drones randomly patrol for criminal or anti-state
activity. Citizens fear that regular drone flights might inadvertently
241

See, e.g., People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
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“We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the
police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating
crimes.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
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collect data from a whole range of individuals unrelated to a specific
investigation.
[78] The answer lies not in requiring a warrant or a particular exception
to the warrant requirement, but in requiring law enforcement to seek a
court order similar to that required for a pen register under 18 U.S.C §
2703. 243 To obtain such a court order, law enforcement officials would
need to demonstrate specific and articulable facts indicating that the data
is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. This would prevent law
enforcement from using drones to randomly search for crime in a
particular area. The order would specify the identity, if known, of the
person who is the subject of the criminal investigation and whom law
enforcement would like to surveil and describe the particularized need for
the information that can be gathered with the drone. 244
[79] The order also should contain language requiring law enforcement
to discard any information collected by the drone that is not relevant to the
scope of the investigation within twenty-four to forty-eighty hours. This
requirement would alleviate any concerns that the government would
collect this information for other nefarious purposes in the future. Being
that it is a court order, this requirement would have teeth as long as
magistrates signing these orders follow up and demand that law
enforcement demonstrate that they in fact have complied with the order
and destroyed any irrelevant information. If a law enforcement officer
fails to comply, a variety of sanctions could be used to demand
243

18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738 n.1 (1979)
(quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)) (“A pen
register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by
monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It
does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually
completed.”).
244

This language is similar to the language required in a pen register court order under 18
U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1).
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compliance. Sanctions even as severe as jail time would cause any law
enforcement agent to comply fully.
[80] The court order also should include a penalty for disclosing to
unauthorized persons data obtained from a drone, thereby limiting
exposure of the information to government personnel working on the
particular case, similar to grand jury secrecy requirements under the
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). 245 Under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(7), “[a] knowing violation of Rule 6 . . . may be
punished as a contempt of court.” 246 Moreover, if the drone is flown
outside the FAA regulated navigable airspace and views activity not
within the public’s vantage point, penalties should also be in place to
punish those individuals in violation of strict flight guidelines provided in
the court order. Punishing individual agents with contempt of court holds
both law enforcement and judges accountable and likely will serve as a
more effective means to prevent government abuse than requiring
warrants prior to drone flights.
[81] The requirement of a court order similar to that found pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 2703 eliminates the charade of fitting drone use within the
Fourth Amendment context. Instead, it mandates a standard similar to that
required for any information the government requests via a court order,
such as a request for a pen register. 247 While the Supreme Court deemed a
pen register to be outside the Fourth Amendment, Congress later passed
18 U.S.C. § 2703 to provide some protections against governmental
abuse. 248 Drone use does not give rise to privacy issues; it gives rise to
245

FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
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FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(7).

247

See § 2703 (defining the narrow circumstances under which the government may
obtain a wiretap).
248

Id.; Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46, superseded by statute, Stored Communications Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711.
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concerns of government abuse and should follow the pen register
precedent. 249
[82] The U.S. Constitution contains no express right to privacy, but the
Fourth Amendment provides certain guarantees for the privacy of the
person and possessions. 250 The “liberty” guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been broadly interpreted to guarantee a fairly broad right
of privacy and privacy issues. 251 The Court can address the possible
infringement on these undefined privacy issues by focusing on the legality
of drone surveillance through the prism of “reasonable” use. If law
enforcement utilizes the drone to collect data that is relevant to a
particular, ongoing investigation, then the drone use is reasonable. 252 The
greater the intrusiveness of the investigatory tool, the greater the
possibility that tool will move into the “search” category of the Fourth
Amendment, at which point the tool becomes unreasonable without a
warrant. 253 Therefore, a drone that hovers around bedroom windows and
takes photographs of the lady of the house taking her daily sauna would be
intrusive and unreasonable and would constitute a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment (as would a drone with thermal imaging or x-ray
capabilities), and a warrant is required. However, if the lady of the house
chooses to walk outside and tend to her garden in her front yard, she must
come to terms with the fact that prying eyes may be watching—whether it
249

However, in order to truly attempt to curb government abuse, it would be imperative
that magistrate judges develop procedures that would track and monitor agents who had
been issued court orders authorizing drone use.
250

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
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See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
252

See, e.g., Anderson v. Mergenhagen, 283 Ga. App. 546, 551 (2007) (quoting
Ellenberg v. Pinkerson’s, 130 Ga. App. 254, 256-57 (1973)).
253

See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001).
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be realtors, Hollywood filmmakers, or law enforcement. The tool used in
public areas is reasonable and can be utilized without a warrant. It would
be reasonable for any of these actors to come across the gardener in the
process of conducting their own drone projects. If law enforcement
requested the utilization of a drone via a § 2703 court order to assist them
in the surveillance of a real-time drug transaction and happen upon the
lady of the house tending her marijuana garden, then it would be
reasonable for the government to use that evidence against her in a
criminal prosecution. 254 Language in the court order should allow for the
subsequent use of this type of information. Once outside, the lady of the
house takes the risk that her actions will be seen; our zones of privacy
where a warrant is required have traditionally been reserved for our indoor
activities.
[83] Our right to privacy stems from our desire to be free from
governmental interference in our daily lives. In the Fourth Amendment
context, we have a right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures and a right to be free from governmental abuse. However, these
protections do not extend to any limitation on law enforcement’s use of
drone surveillance in public areas for a specific purpose. There is no
realistic expectation of privacy when a drone passes over one’s house or
car or observes our activity in public. We gave up the luxury of privacy in
public places long ago.
[84] Drone use by law enforcement must be limited but not unduly
subjected to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, as drones should not constitute a
“search.” To limit the temptation to use drones to “look for crime,” law
enforcement could be subject to the court order process prior to utilizing a
drone in an investigation.

254

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
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[85] In my opinion, in the following scenarios drone use by law
enforcement might fall closer towards a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment and a warrant would most likely be required:
(1) The drone is flown outside FAA navigable airspace for aircraft
and helicopters (below 400 feet);
(2) The drone collects information emanating from within the
home (similar to thermal imaging or infrared sensors that
detect movement);
(3) Law enforcement uses highly sophisticated technology that is
not commercially available (e.g., automated license plate
readers or facial recognition technology);
(4) The drone hovers around a particular area which may
constitute a long-term sustained monitoring as mentioned in
Jones, and a reasonable expectation of privacy is triggered; or
(5) The drone hovers and creates an undue amount of wind, noise,
dust, or threat of injury that could constitute a “trespass.”
[86] Fourth Amendment cases invoking the Katz or Jones doctrines all
touch upon
the nature of the technology used (does it permit the
government to “see” what would otherwise be invisible to
the naked eye, even in daylight, from a lawful vantage
point) and the nature of the place being observed (is it an
open field, the curtilage of a home, commercial property as
in Dow Chemical, or the interior of a home?). 255
The more a drone operates outside of FAA guidelines and the more a
drone causes undue dust, noise, and wind, the more the drone operation
will constitute a trespass and the Fourth Amendment is triggered. The
255

1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATION 95 (6th ed. 2013).
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more a drone uses highly sophisticated technology not available for public
use or collects information from inside the home, the more the drone
operation will constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment as
citizens will have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area and
activities being observed.
[87] Therefore, drones that fly within FAA navigable airspace,
observing private property below that can be seen by the public in an
aircraft, and using commercially available cameras or enhanced sensory
technology, would fall outside Fourth Amendment protections and should
be regulated via court order as previously suggested.
VII. CONCLUSION
[88] The use of drones by law enforcement does not trigger Fourth
Amendment protections. Drone surveillance does not constitute a trespass
nor does it violate one’s reasonable expectation of privacy. As a society,
we have begun to accept a diminished expectation of privacy. The real
question becomes one of reasonableness and whether the use of drones is
deemed a reasonable, acceptable law enforcement investigatory tool
without requiring a warrant.
[89] Most reasonable people, if asked, would deem it acceptable to
allow the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to place cameras in
areas where companies are known to dump toxic chemicals in order to
catch the violators. Most reasonable people, if asked, would likely deem it
acceptable and prudent for the EPA to place mobile cameras along
sections of a polluted river to monitor for illegal dumping. Is it then
logical to assume it acceptable and prudent for the EPA to utilize drones
equipped with cameras to monitor the river for illegal dumping?
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[90] Drones equipped with a type of mobile camera are used by the
Forest Service to monitor for forest fires. 256 Should drone film footage be
admissible as evidence at a criminal trial if the drone captures an arsonist
starting a forest fire? Ditto when a drone captures images of a suspected
marijuana field?
[91] Society appears to be comfortable with cameras in public areas.
After the Boston Marathon bombing in April 2013, law enforcement
obtained photographs from store surveillance cameras in order to identify
the Boston bomber. 257 Rather than public outrage at the excessive use of
surveillance cameras for law enforcement purposes, the public demanded
that more be done by law enforcement. There was strong public interest in
catching the bombing suspects. In cities such as Washington D.C. and
New York City, cameras are everywhere. 258 Google Earth and satellite
technology have become commonplace. Drones equipped with cameras
are simply the latest in surveillance technology. The public is not as
concerned about government surveillance in public areas as it once was.
[92] Whether our right to privacy is being violated by the increased use
of drones by law enforcement is not the true issue. Commercially, the use
of drones in the private sector is becoming even more pervasive. The
concern is law enforcement abuse—that the government will collect the
video and photographs from drone surveillance for a purportedly
legitimate purpose only to use this material for other nefarious or
256

See Amy Gahran, Fighting Fire with Data, Spacecraft, Drones, CNN (July 26, 2012,
9:37 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/26/tech/innovation/technology-fighting-fire/.
257

See Bev Ford, Greg B. Smith, & Larry McShane, Police Narrow in on Two Suspects
in Boston Marathon Bombings, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 17, 2013, 10:08 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/injury-toll-rises-marathon-massacre-article1.1319080.
258

See, e.g., Allison Linn, Post 9/11, Surveillance Cameras Everywhere,
NBCNEWS.com, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44163852/ns/business-us_business/t/postsurveillance-cameras-everywhere/#.U1P5qvldWSo (last updated Aug. 23, 2011).
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illegitimate purposes. As one judge who was critical of the government
explained in a false arrest tort case,
In Hamlet’s soliloquy, one of the “whips and scorns” which
led the great Dane to consider whether death was better
than life was “the insolence of office.” In those few words,
the Bard managed to express the aggravations and futilities
pressed on any of us when public officials vent their sour
stomachs in performing their duties. The authority to wear
a badge or to wield a pen in power over others seems to
fuel in us a sense of mastery, and not of service. It is a
common failing, and all of us public servants succumb to it
at some point. 259
[93] While the judge in this false arrest case may have been referring to
either inappropriate behavior by Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
officials, or possibly the police officers who took their cues from these
DMV officials, the message is clear: we must find ways to keep law
enforcement officials in check. In this new age of openness and desire for
public exposure, privacy rights and levels of intrusiveness are not as
important as whether the law enforcement action is reasonable. Drone use
is not a trespass and does not violate one’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. The use of drones by law enforcement must be regulated, but this
technique falls outside of Fourth Amendment protections as it does not
constitute a “search.” Therefore, it would be better for legislators and
courts alike to request that law enforcement seek a court order when
contemplating the use of drones similar to authorizations needed for a pen
register.
[94] If state and federal legislators are successful and remain on a
determined course to restrict application of drones, drone use may be
severely limited, similar to what took place after the court decision on
259

Wright v. State, 752 P.2d 748, 751 (Mont. 1988) (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
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thermal imaging. After the Kyllo decision in which the Court held that
thermal imaging constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, 260 law
enforcement was no longer able to use the technology to assist in building
sufficient probable cause for a search warrant. Admittedly, thermal
imaging allows law enforcement the ability to collect intelligence within
private dwellings, i.e., locations where the owner has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Drone surveillance collects intelligence in public
areas where there is no such expectation of privacy. Law enforcement
needs a variety of investigatory tools that can be used without a warrant in
order to gather enough facts for probable cause to justify search and arrest
warrants. If government becomes significantly limited in its ability to
collect information in a reasonable and impartial manner, the ability to
investigate a complaint and determine if a crime has been committed will
be hindered. Drone use is a reasonable, non-intrusive technique and
should be one of those investigatory tools available to law enforcement
agencies. Public safety requires that law enforcement have the ability to
leverage every reasonable investigatory tool at its disposal to uphold the
law and bring criminals to justice. Some techniques which are intrusive
and infringe on privacy issues need to be closely monitored and regulated.
[95] Public concern is understandable—thousands of drones from both
the public and private sector will soon be accumulating a significant
amount of information once FAA regulations are put in place by 2015.
Drone technology is in its infancy stage. Future drones may be lighter,
simpler, with longer flight times and have the ability to act/react to given
situations based on software programming without human intervention.
Previously, laws were passed to regulate new technology after its effects
and impact on society were determined. In the case of drones, state and
federal legislatures are attempting to get ahead of the curve and pass laws
based on what drones can be expected to do in the future. I think we are
getting ahead of ourselves. The drones of today are the same as aircraft
and helicopters which are currently used to conduct aerial surveillance.
260

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001).
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There is no need to place greater restrictions on drones than regular
aircraft. The unintended victims of such a law would be smaller law
enforcement agencies that cannot afford their own aircraft or helicopter.
Inexpensive drone technology would allow all law enforcement agencies
to operate on a level playing field in the use of aerial surveillance for
investigations.
[96] From binoculars, to flashlights, to drones, companies will continue
to design enhanced surveillance techniques and their requisite sensory
enhancements for both law enforcement and private use. Future court
decisions will determine if these new technologies and enhancements fall
outside of or are subject to Fourth Amendment protections (e.g., future
drones installed with infrared sensors, facial recognition technology,
license plate readers, or drones designed with solar power to stay aloft for
longer periods of time). These law enforcement technologies will face
constant scrutiny for their possible infringement on our expectations of
privacy, and will be re-evaluated again and again.
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DRONE LEGISLATION BY STATE 261
TABLE 1: PASSED LEGISLATION
State

Bill #

Status of Bill

Law Enforcement Restrictions

Florida

F.S.A. § 934.50

Legislation effective as
of 01 July 2013

Idaho

I.C. § 21-213

Legislation effective as
of 01 July 2013

Illinois

725 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 167/1 et
seq.

Legislation effective as
of 01 January 2014

Law Enforcement can only use
drones when (1) combating an
eminent threat of terrorism; (2)
pursuant to a search warrant; (3)
preventing imminent death or severe
bodily harm.
Requires warrant, except for
emergency response for safety,
search and rescue or controlled
substance investigations.
Requires warrant except to prevent
terrorist attack, pursuant to a warrant,
prevent death or severe bodily harm,
prevent escape or a suspect, or to
protect evidence. Must destroy all
information gathered within 30 days
unless there is a pending
investigation or trial. Must make an
annual report on drone usage.

Indiana

HB 1009

Legislation will be
effective as of 01 July
2014

261

Law enforcement must obtain search
warrant except in cases of: (1)
exigent circumstances; (2) where
there is a substantial likelihood of
terrorist attack; (3) when conducting
search and rescues; (4) where
mitigating or responding to natural
disasters; or (5) for surveys not used

Data updated through June 10, 2014. ** denotes FAA test site.
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for criminal justice purposes.

Iowa

HF 2289

Signed by Governor
May 23, 2014

Montana

Mont. Code
Ann. § 46-5109

Legislation effective as
of 01 October 2013

Oregon

Or. Rev. Stat. §
837.300 et seq.

Effective as of June 29,
2013

Tennessee

Tenn. Code
Ann. §39-13609

Legislation effective as
of 01 July 2013; 2014
legislation enacted, goes
into effect July 1, 2014

62

Information obtained by use of drone
is inadmissible unless secured with
use of warrant or otherwise obtained
in a manner that is consistent with
state and federal law. Drones may
not be used for traffic law
enforcement.
Requires warrant or any judicially
recognized exception. Cannot use
information gathered via drone in an
application or affidavit for a warrant.
Requires warrant unless there is a
reasonable belief that there is a threat
of bodily harm or death and an
affidavit is filed within 48 hours, to
reconstruct a crime scene, for search
and rescue operations, or during a
declared state of emergency for
public safety purposes only. Drones
may not be weaponized.
Requires warrant or used to combat
terrorist threat, there is reasonable
suspicion that there is an imminent
threat to life, to prevent escape of
suspect, or to search for a missing
person. Specifically designates
drone use as a search and the search
shall comply with the federal and TN
Constitutions. However, only
exceptions to the warrant
requirement listed in this statute
apply.
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Texas**

Tex. Gov’t
Code §423 et.
Seq.

Legislation effective as
of Sept. 1, 2013

Utah

S.B. 16702

Legislation enacted,
goes into effect May 13,
2014.

Virginia**

H. 2012

Wisconsin

S.B. 196

Legislation effective as
of July 1, 2013; 2014
bill introduced;
legislature adjourned
without further action
Legislation enacted,
went into effect April 9,
2014.
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Requires warrant or pursuit of a
suspect, documentation of a crime
scene, when searching for a missing
person, in a tactical situation where
there is a threat to human life, or
where a property owner consents to
law enforcement. The Department of
Public Safety shall adopt rules and
guidelines for use of an unmanned
aircraft by a law enforcement
authority in this state. Must make a
report of drone usage in January of
every odd numbered year.
Requires warrant, judicially
recognized exception to warrant
requirement, or use by
nongovernmental actor acting in
good faith and where data pertains to
imminent or ongoing emergency
involving danger of death or serious
bodily harm.
Prohibits usage of drone prior to July
1, 2013 except for amber alerts,
search and rescue, training, and
National Guard use.
Law Enforcement agents must obtain
a warrant in order to use drone
except when used to assist search and
rescue operations, location of
escaped prisoners, or where there is
imminent danger to an individual or
of destruction of property.
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TABLE 2: PENDING LEGISLATION
State

Bill #

Status of Bill

Law Enforcement Restrictions

Alabama

SB317

Passed Senate.

Alaska**

HCR 6

Legislative Resolution
17 passed; legislature
adjourned

H.B. 209

Referred to Judiciary

HB 2269

Referred to Senate
Rules Committee

HB 2538

Referred to House
Judiciary Committee

Law Enforcement can only use
drones when (1) combating an
eminent threat of terrorism; (2)
pursuant to a search warrant; (3)
preventing imminent death or severe
bodily harm.
Creates a task force to assist the FAA
with creating a safe place for the
testing of drones and development of
adequate safety procedures for future
drone use.
Law Enforcement can only use drone
if authorized by search warrant,
except that peace officers may use
drone to assist during an emergency
involving imminent danger of death
or serious physical injury to a person
or property.
Law Enforcement can only use
drones when (1) Combating an
eminent threat of terrorism; (2)
pursuant to a search warrant; (3)
preventing imminent death or severe
bodily harm.
Law Enforcement can only use drone
if authorized by search warrant.

AB 1327

Passed House and
passed Senate
committee

Arizona

California

64

Requires warrant, or use to prevent
imminent severe bodily harm or
death, hot pursuit, or first responder
situations.
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Connecticut

HB 5217

Pending before Joint
Judiciary Committee

Georgia

H.B. 560

In Judiciary Committee

S.B. 200

In Judiciary Committee

S.B. 783

Passed Senate;
legislature adjourned
without further action.

H.B 1691

Referred to
Transportation
Committee

H.B. 2683

Referred to Committee
on Federal and State
Affairs
Committee
recommended bill be
passed

Hawaii

Kansas

S.B. 409
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Law Enforcement can only operate
drones for legitimate law
enforcement purposes and only
pursuant to warrant or emergency
circumstances.
Creates misdemeanor for anyone
who knowingly violates or
knowingly assists someone in
violating statute. Law enforcement
must have a warrant, no exceptions.
Allows for exigent circumstances
exception. Drones may only be used
in investigations of felonies, not
misdemeanors.
S.B. Must have a warrant unless used
to prevent reasonably certain severe
bodily harm or death. Supervisor
must file with the circuit court a
sworn statement describing the
emergency.
Law enforcement can only use drone:
(1) to counter high risk of terrorist
attack; (2) pursuant to valid search
warrant; (3) in accordance with
judicially recognized exception to
warrant; (4) where swift action is
needed.
H.B. Requires threat of terrorist
activity and warrant.
Requires warrant or emergency
situation.

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 3

Kentucky

H.B. 342

Introduced; legislature
adjourned without
further action

Requires search warrant, unless no
part of any information or evidence is
used in any legal proceeding or for
any intelligence purposes, or is used
by active service members stationed
within the Commonwealth.

Louisiana

SB 330

Involuntarily deferred in
committee

Contains very few meaningful
protections from drone surveillance
by law enforcement.

Massachusetts

Bill H. 1357

Introduced

Requires warrant, non-law
enforcement use or emergency with
sworn statement filed with the court
within 48 hours. Restricts use of
biometric software to the target.
Requires data destruction after 24
hours unless pending investigation or
trial. Courts shall report the number
of uses of drones annually.

Michigan

H.B. 4455

Introduced

Absolute ban on armed drones.
Drone must clearly indicate what
agency it belongs to. Requires
warrant, imminent threat to life or
severe bodily harm, or other
emergency. Requires filing of sworn
statement within 48 hours if used
without warrant. Narrow tailoring of
observation and recordings to target.
Data is destroyed within 24 hours
unless used for investigation. Very
detailed reporting to legislature 3
times/ year.
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Missouri

H.B. 1204

Placed on informal
calendar

Requires warrant, emergency
situation, or where used to assess
necessity of first responders.

Nevada**

SCR 7

Compels state to actively compete
for FAA approval to be a drone
testing site.

New York**

Bill No.
A06370 /
A08091/S04537

Introduced, but no
further action. Next
legislative session
begins February 2015
Introduced

North
Carolina

H312

Two-year moratorium
enacted (PDF, p. 41) in
2013. Legislature is
engaged in an interim
study process that will
likely produce further
legislation.

Ohio

H.B. 207

Committee Report

Must have a warrant unless used to
prevent harm to life or property,
prevent the escape of a suspect, or
prevent imminent destruction of
evidence. Supervisor must file with
the circuit court a sworn statement
describing the emergency within 48
hours. Law enforcement must
provide annual report on its drone
usage.
Requires warrant, high risk of
terrorist attack as determined by U.S.
Homeland Security Secretary, or to
prevent imminent harm to life or
serious damage to property, or to
forestall escape of a suspect or
destruction of evidence. No drone
shall be equipped with any weapon
of any kind.
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Requires warrant unless there is a
reasonable belief that there is an
imminent danger to life.
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Pennsylvania

S.B. 189

Pending before State
Government Oversight
and Reform Committee

H.B. 961/2158

Referred to Judiciary
Committee

H.B. 2158

Referred to Judiciary
Committee

S.B. 875

Referred to Senate
committee on State
Government
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Can use drones in an emergency
situation as long as there is
documentation of the emergency and
a supervisor files a sworn statement
with the courts within 48 hours of
beginning of the drone's use. There
is evidence of a threat to national
security or evidence of organized
crime and a warrant is applied for
and received within 48 hours of the
beginning of surveillance. Use of
drones must comply with FAA
regulations.
H.B. 961Requires a court order in the
same manner that a wiretap does.
Must be used to assist in the
apprehension of a suspect who is
suspected of a crime which is
dangerous to life, limb or property,
and subject to imprisonment for more
than 1 year.
Requires either (1) warrant; (2) use in
connection with Amber Alert; (3) use
in connection with a declared
emergency; (4) for the purpose of
search or rescue operations; or (5) to
alleviate imminent threat of death or
grave injury to person.
Prevents use of drones prior to July
2015 unless used during and amber
alert, state of emergency, or search
and rescue when necessary to protect
life, health, or property. Prohibits
weaponizing of drones. Allows for
the PA National Guard to use drones
for its training.
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South
Carolina

H3415

In Judiciary Committee

Vermont

H.0540 /S. 0169

In Judiciary Committee

West Virginia

H.B. 2732

In House Judiciary
committee
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H3415- Requires warrant or belief of
a threat of death, bodily harm, escape
of a suspect, or destruction of
evidence.
Requires warrant or there is a threat
of death or serious bodily injury
AND a warrant is obtained within 48
hours. Drones may not be armed.
Annual reports must be made by the
department of safety on drone usage.
No drones may be operated by law
enforcement in the state except to
combat terrorism and with a warrant.
Drones may not carry lethal
munitions.
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TABLE 3: FURTHER STUDY
State

Bill #

Status of Bill

Law Enforcement Restrictions

New
Hampshire

H.B. 1620

Referred to interim
study

Requires warrant, prior consent, or
reasonable suspicion that swift action
is needed to prevent harm to life or
serious damage.

Rhode Island

H5780/H7170

House Judiciary
Committee
recommended bill be
held pending further
study

Requires public hearing prior to any
agency purchasing a drone. Requires
court order or when there is a
reasonable belief that there is an
imminent threat to life or physical
safety and an affidavit is submitted to
the court within 24 hours describing
the emergency.

S0411/ 2362

Senate Judiciary
Committee
recommended bill be
held pending further
study

Requires a warrant. No exceptions.
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TABLE 4: LEGISLATION DEAD
State

Bill #

Status of Bill

Law Enforcement Restrictions

Arkansas

HB 1904 / SB
1109

Died in Senate and
House, held without
action

Required use of warrant, threat to
national security, or evidence of
organized crime activity. Contained
minimalization policies (e.g. facial
recognition software cannot be run
on non-target footage.). Mandated
Law enforcement to report annually
on the use of drones.

Maryland

S.B. 926/H.B.
847

Died in committee

Minnesota

H.F. 1620

Died in committee

Nebraska

L.B. 412

Indefinitely postponed

New Jersey

A1039

Referred to Homeland
Security and State
Preparedness
Committee

Requires consent, warrant,
emergency, or grounds on which a
warrant can be obtained with due
diligence and application is made
within 48 hours.
H.F. Requires warrant, terrorist
threat, imminent danger to persons or
property, or prevent escape of
suspect. Drones may be used by first
responders.
Provides that drones may only be
used when there is a high probability
of a terrorist attack.
Law enforcement must acquire
warrant or consent, or there must be
probable cause to believe exigent
circumstances exist or when locating
missing persons.
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Maine

L.D. 236

Passed both chambers;
vetoed by Governor;
veto sustained

New Mexico

S.B. 556

Dead

North
Dakota**

H.B. 1373

Failed in Senate

Washington

H.B. 1771/S.B.
6172

Passed both chambers,
VETOED by governor

Wyoming

H.B. 0242

Died in committee

H.B. 0105

Not considered by the
Committee as a Whole
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Would have required either a warrant
or an emergency situation, with a
sworn statement being filed with the
court no later than 48 hours afterward
explaining emergency. Had
information destruction after 48
hours unless pending investigation or
trial.
Required warrant unless there was a
reasonable belief that there was an
imminent threat to life.
Requires warrant unless used for
border patrol and within 25 miles of
international border, there is a
reasonable belief that there is an
imminent risk of death or bodily
harm, or in response to a natural
disaster. Drones may not be armed.
Requires warrant, warrant expires in
48 hours. Also may use if there is an
immediate threat of death or serious
bodily harm and a warrant is
obtained within 48 hours.
Requires warrant or swift action is
needed to prevent an imminent
danger to life, to counter a high risk
of terrorist attack, investigate a
felony in progress, to assist in the
fresh pursuit of a person believed to
have committed a felony.
Same as H.B. 0242.
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TABLE 5: NO ACTION
State
Colorado
Delaware
Oklahoma

Bill #

Status of Bill

H.B. 1556

There was a bill
introduced in the house,
but it failed and the
legislature seems to
have removed
everything except the
fact it existed at some
point.

Mississippi
South Dakota
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